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At the time of writing, it has just been announced that the federal Office for Civil Rights has 
upheld the California Department of Managed Health Care’s instruction to health insurers 
covering employees of churches, religiously-affiliated schools and universities, and other 
religious organizations, that they must cover abortion in their plans under the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA)—irrespective of any objections by the plan purchasers.1 
This Californian problem has been rumbling on for several years, and the latest ruling 
reaffirms the state government’s attitude: conscientious objection has no force against the 
provision of abortion via Obamacare. Needless to say, the complaint will run its course through 
the courts, but it seems, given previous judicial rulings, that only the Supreme Court can save 
conscientious objection in California. 
In such a blatant case as this, it is clear that the plan purchasers would be compelled to co-
operate in wrongdoing. (I leave aside the substantive question of the morality of abortion, 
which is another topic. The objectors sincerely believe that abortion is wrong, so let us assume 
it to be wrong for the purpose of analysis.) But what does co-operation in wrongdoing amount 
to, and how to do we judge what kinds of co-operation are themselves morally objectionable? 
The primary distinction is between formal and material co-operation.2 In formal co-operation, 
the co-operator intends the wrong committed by the principal agent, even if he does not intend 
to perform it himself and even if he does not believe the principal act is wrong.3 In other words, 
he shares the guilt of the principal. The Californian case is clear: the plan purchasers do not 
intend either for the insurer to cover abortion or for any abortion to be performed. 
So they count as material co-operators. Here, the relevant principles are those governing the 
doctrine of double effect in general (DDE).4 Why so? Because the agential structure is the same 
as in double-effect cases: the agent intentionally performs an act with both good and bad 
effects, something that may well be permitted if the right conditions apply even though doing 
good and avoiding evil is the fundamental principle of morality. First, what the agent does must 
itself be at least morally permissible. Secondly, the agent must not intend the bad effect itself. 
Third, the bad effect must not itself be a means to the good one, for otherwise the agent would 
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be using a bad means to a good end. Finally, there must be some kind of proportionality 
between the good and bad effects, sufficient to permit the causation of the latter for the sake 
of5 the former. Proportionality is not essentially a balancing of outcomes as per consequential-
ism, but rather an answer to the question: Are there good enough reasons for permitting the 
bringing about of the bad effect, in terms of what is achieved by production of the good effect? 
Here, it seems fairly clear that the first condition is violated because the act of the plan 
purchaser is to purchase health insurance for employees that covers abortion. As an act, it is no 
more morally permissible than a doctor’s signing a certificate authorizing someone else to 
perform an abortion. But even if the co-operative act (purchasing the insurance) were 
considered permissible, there would be a question over the fourth condition. The bad effect is 
co-operation in the provision of abortion. The good effect is the avoidance of the severe 
penalties of non-compliance with the Affordable Care Act and related state laws and 
regulations. The penalties might be sufficient (let us suppose) to put the plan purchaser out of 
business or stop its effective functioning (a church, say). This is a great evil, but it is not a 
threat to life or limb; abortion, on the other hand, is a direct attack upon life. (Again, we are 
supposing this for the purpose of analysis.) So there seems to be a clear disproportionality 
between the good and bad effects. 
Yet condition 4 is not merely about weighing effects, however this is done. The good effect 
of avoiding the severe penalties for non-compliance is substantial, though not as substantial as 
the evil effect of taking a life. This does not of itself rule out or in the co-operative act. What it 
means is that the co-operator needs a greater reason for assisting the principal than he would 
were the good and bad effects comparable. Environmentalists like to tell us that taking the car 
needs greater justification when the good effect does not significantly exceed the bad effect of 
the extra pollution than when the good effect is substantially greater.6 Compare taking the car 
on a walkable trip to buy milk versus taking your child on a long journey to the hospital. It is, 
of course, easy to imagine cases where the disproportionality is so great that nothing can justify 
co-operation: if I threaten not to be your friend unless you help me beat up an old lady, it is 
hard to see what reason could compensate for the massive lack of balance between effects. 
When it comes to working out what sort of reason can justify certain behavior in a given 
situation, the question in co-operation cases is how the effects relate to the co-operator’s action: 
the more the co-operator is implicated in the principal act, the graver the reason they need for 
co-operating. Someone who edits pornography movies prior to sale, for instance, needs greater 
reason for co-operation than someone who sells the cameras. The former is a more proximate 
co-operator than the latter. Proximity is a factor in implication: it is not only, and sometimes 
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not at all, about spatio-temporal distance between the principal agent and the co-operator. It is 
about the executive character of the co-operative act—in other words whether, morally 
speaking, the co-operator is more like the principal in what they do than someone else actually 
or hypothetically situated in the same chain of events. Proximity is not an absolute matter; one 
is more or less proximate relative to others, or to how oneself or another might have been 
situated. Now entering into a contract to provide insurance coverage for abortion, although not 
as proximate as assisting the abortionist in the clinic, is more proximate than, say, typing up 
the contract and posting it to the insurer. Indeed, in activities where insurable risk is present, 
providing the insurance is one of the key factors that supports the risky activity itself, allowing 
it to be carried out in confidence of protection. One of the motivating ideas behind the ACA is 
that “reproductive rights,” as they are called, be given “seamless coverage.”7 Insurance 
provides the backstop whereby abortion can be carried out without fear of cost or 
administrative burden. Therefore, as well as protecting the act in general, the insurance protects 
particular acts at particular times. This gives the insurance, as with most insurance, an executive 
character putting it very close to the activity itself. 
Moreover, the co-operation looks to be indispensable, in the following way. It is not that 
indispensable co-operation has to be an absolute sine qua non of the principal act, in the sense 
that without it the act simply cannot be performed short of a miracle. It is, rather, that the 
principal act, practically speaking, cannot be performed, or would be performed with great 
difficulty, or would have its probability significantly lowered without the co-operation. 
Providing the burglar with the code to a safe that only you know is as indispensable as can be, 
assuming no other means of access. Handing the burglar the keys to your car is dispensable, 
assuming the burglar could threaten anyone else to do the same. Again, there is a spectrum of 
cases: we are not dealing with mathematics but with ethics, and as we cannot repeat too often, 
Aristotle taught us not to expect more precision that the subject matter allows. 
Now, though, we have a problem: What is it that a hypothetical employee of the plan 
purchaser might want? Is it abortion? Is it abortion without cost-sharing? Is it abortion without 
cost-sharing while remaining an employee of the purchaser? We have to look at all the 
circumstances and ask ourselves what exactly the plan purchaser would be helping the 
employee to do. Two important questions to ask here are: What does the employee want help 
with, and what does the employer think they are helping with? It seems pretty clear that, given 
the purpose of the ACA and of employee health plans generally and given the situation of the 
parties, by purchasing the coverage the employer is helping the employee get trouble-free and 
cost-free abortion coverage as an employee. As such, the employer’s co-operation is well-nigh 
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indispensable, practically speaking, even though in the current situation the employee could 
make alternative arrangements with difficulty. 
There is a lot more that could be said about the California case and its specifics. My purpose 
has been to show that there is a principled way of looking at co-operation cases that does not 
involve appeal to religious doctrine or expression per se and that is not wholly subjective. Here, 
the employer looks to be a proximate and indispensable material co-operator in wrongdoing by 
providing the coverage, assuming for the sake of argument that the initial act of purchasing the 
coverage is itself permissible (an assumption I in fact deny). As such, it would be morally 
wrong to purchase the coverage, and the state would be compelling the objector to engage in 
immoral behavior. As in U.K. cases, where Catholic adoption agencies have all but ceased 
functioning as such due to government compulsion to pair children with homosexual couples,8 
it would be incumbent on the Californian objectors to submit to the penalties even if it meant 
going out of business or radically changing the nature of their operation. 
The situation is similar to that in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, where a “closely-held for-profit 
corporation” was granted an exemption from purchasing employee coverage under the 
“contraceptive mandate,” particularly with reference to abortifacient drugs. As is well known, 
the Supreme Court held that the mandate substantially burdened the freedom of religion of the 
employers under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). Unfortunately, 
though, matters start to get even thornier than many observers of the current state of play think 
they already are. For whilst I agree with the decision in Hobby Lobby, I do not think the case 
was decided for the right reasons. Yes, the plaintiffs were compelled by the mandate to become 
illicit co-operators in wrongdoing; and perhaps, given the RFRA jurisprudence, the case was 
correctly interpreted. If it was, though, then that jurisprudence is in my view wrong, as I go on 
to explain. In any case, the reasoning in Hobby Lobby has led to the impasse over Zubik v. 
Burwell, in which SCOTUS reversed the previous decisions per curiam and sent the case back 
to the lower courts where, at the time of writing, it lies.9 
The problem centres on the question of how a conscientious objector’s belief about co-
operation is to be understood. Is it a religious/conscientious belief,10 or is it a belief that we 
might call ancillary to a religious belief, perhaps one that is derived from a mixture of religious 
and non-religious beliefs? We need to get clear about the structure of a standard case of Hobby 
Lobby-style conscientious objection. There is a principal act that the objector sincerely believes 
contravenes his/her religious beliefs. Abortion is the most common case post-ACA (including 
abortifacient “contraception”). In other words, taking the Christian context—for it seems to be 
Christians litigating the most frequently—it is an accepted Christian doctrine that abortion is 
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immoral. The objector believes that doctrine. Clearly, then, the belief is a belief that is 
essentially religious in nature, one derived from religious teaching.11 Call this the primary 
belief—the one involving disapproval of the principal act. 
In addition, there is the objector’s belief—call it secondary—that co-operating with the 
primary act is itself immoral. Is this secondary belief itself a religious belief? Well, if the 
objector can show that the belief is somehow embodied in religious teaching, then it too will 
be a religious belief. For example, certain kinds of co-operation in wrongdoing are condemned 
by old-style moral theology manuals of the Catholic Church.12 The condemnation is not 
idiosyncratic, but was (and perhaps is) accepted as standard moral theological teaching across 
the texts used in seminaries, schools, and universities. We can presume that something roughly 
similar applies in many Christian churches; indeed, plaintiffs in the recent cases have been 
either Catholic or of various Protestant denominations. 
Not every kind of co-operation is wrong, however, whether by religious or non-religious 
lights. So it is not as though a plaintiff can simply say, for example: “Co-operation in abortion 
is wrong, as taught by my church. By purchasing employee health coverage for abortion I 
would be co-operating in abortion. Therefore my religious freedom is being violated.” To 
repeat, not every kind of co-operation in wrongdoing is itself wrong. Hence there must be an 
implied tertiary belief involved, e.g., purchasing health insurance for abortion is a wrongful 
form of co-operation. What should we say about this sort of belief? The specific example is 
relatively uncontentious, as I have already claimed: purchasing such coverage (at least as I have 
assumed it to be in the Californian scenario) is proximate, indispensable co-operation and, as 
such, wrong. Now, the theological textbooks agree on the principles, and usually on their 
application, albeit the purchase of health insurance is not exactly a staple of books from the 
1950s and 1960s, where co-operation is discussed extensively. But even if they all said, or if 
some approved religious authority said, that purchasing health coverage for abortion was illicit 
co-operation, in my view this would not itself be a religious belief and protected as such by 
RFRA and the associated jurisprudence. 
Why not? The reason is that the application of religious principles to particular facts is not 
itself a matter of religious belief or teaching, even if all religious authorities make the same 
application in the same way and say so in their texts. More specifically, applying principles of 
co-operation—even ones that are a matter of religious teaching—to the facts of a particular 
case is a matter of logic, prudence, and common sense, not a matter of religious belief. When 
theologians, or religious authorities, apply the principles of co-operation to particular cases, 
they are neither explaining existing religious teaching, nor amplifying it. They are using logic, 
Co-operation in the Age of Hobby Lobby  20 
 
 
prudence, and common sense to derive particular conclusions about particular cases. Now, 
maybe a trained theologian can do this better than the man in the street, but something is not 
ipso facto a theological matter because it is done by a theologian. 
To see this more clearly, we have to recognize that the principles of co-operation, minus 
questions of wrongdoing, apply just as well to cases of perfectly acceptable behavior. For 
instance, I co-operate formally with your mowing the lawn when I plug the brand new mower 
in for you and show you how to use it. You co-operate materially with my buying a six-pack 
of beer by lending me the money because you are my friend, knowing that beer is what I am 
going to buy, but not intending for me to buy it—say due to worries that I might not be sober 
enough for work the next morning. If you have forgotten the password to your computer and I 
alone know it, I co-operate indispensably with you by reminding you what it is. You co-operate 
proximately with my driving to the shop by filling up my car with petrol for me. My co-
operation with your going for a jog is remote when I merely offer to pick up your children from 
school for you. And so on. 
In other words, the application of general principles of co-operation to particular cases 
straddles both wrong and permissible behavior. The application itself is morally neutral, nor is 
it a matter of religious doctrine. One can apply the principles without knowing or caring about 
religion, and without knowing that the principles themselves are theological in nature. In fact, 
although my argument does not hang on this, I doubt that even the principles themselves—e.g., 
that formal co-operation in wrongdoing is itself wrong—are essentially theological. Rather, 
theologians have codified what seems to be part of common-sense moral reasoning, just as the 
Doctrine of Double Effect, despite its codification in religious textbooks, is itself a piece of 
common-sense moral reasoning. 
In any case, recognizing that the application of the principles of co-operation is not itself a 
religious matter is essential to seeing what went wrong with Hobby Lobby and now bedevils 
the theory of co-operation in the wake of that important case. For it is settled law that no court 
can look behind the sincerity of a person’s religious beliefs when the person objects to an 
infringement of their freedom of religion, whether under RFRA or under the Constitution more 
generally. As the majority point out in Hobby Lobby, in respect of the sincere belief of the 
owners of the relevant corporations that providing coverage under the contraceptive mandate 
violated their religious beliefs, “it is not for us to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken 
or insubstantial,” only to determine that the objectors have an “honest conviction” that this is 
so.13 This has long been the legal position as far as religious beliefs are concerned.14 
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If, then, the belief of an objector that by doing X they are co-operating illicitly in some other 
act Y is itself a religious belief, no court is allowed to look behind the sincerity with which it 
is held. In other words, no court is allowed to assess the reasonableness of the belief. Now in 
the case of Hobby Lobby this did not present a problem, which is why the outcome was in my 
view correct. The Greens and the Hahns, owners of the relevant corporations, sincerely 
believed they would be illicitly co-operating with abortion by providing employee coverage 
under the contraceptive mandate. My analysis of the recent California case above would lead 
to the same result: purchasing health insurance to cover employees engaged in wrongful 
activity would not itself be a morally indifferent act. Even if it was, the employers would be 
material but proximate co-operators in serious wrongdoing, without a reason sufficient to 
outweigh the gravity of what they would be involved in. The financial penalties for non-
compliance would be severe, perhaps threatening the survival of the corporations themselves 
and the livelihoods of many people. Yet it is hard to see how proximate co-operation in the 
taking of life can be justified by a pecuniary penalty for refusing. 
What about indispensability? I have assumed in the California case that co-operation is 
indispensable.15 In Hobby Lobby, the Court noted that alternative arrangements for coverage 
could be made for employees using federal exchanges and independent action by health 
insurers or third-party administrators, without employer involvement.16 Against this 
background, the co-operation in Hobby Lobby looks more to be dispensable. Still, the proximity 
of the cooperation and the nature of the evil involved arguably outweigh dispensability. 
Consider the imaginary albeit slightly fanciful case of a large landowner renting his property 
to slave owners. Suppose the government considered slavery to be so important to the economy 
that it required such landowners to provide slavery insurance covering some or all of the tenant 
slave owners’ cost of acquisition and/or maintenance of their slaves. Would we not find the 
purchasing of such insurance to implicate the landowner in so grave a wrong that he would be 
justified in objecting, even if the government were to step in with coverage should the 
landowner refuse to provide it? Moreover, wouldn’t the prospect of the landowner going out 
of business altogether be seen as a price worth paying for resisting complicity in such a wrong? 
Whatever one thinks of the outcome in Hobby Lobby, however, the point is that it was 
decided on the sole ground that the objectors sincerely believed they would be illicit co-
operators. That is, the judgment was that purchasing the insurance “substantially burdened” the 
objectors’ exercise of religion under RFRA, not because they would be illicit co-operators in 
what they sincerely believed, according to religious teaching, to be an immoral act, but because 
they sincerely believed that, according to religious teaching, they would be guilty of such co-
Co-operation in the Age of Hobby Lobby  22 
 
 
operation. Deciding the case on that ground, however, seems to me a grave mistake, whether 
or not it is the right way of interpreting the jurisprudence on religious freedom. 
Why, though, does it matter, given that the outcome was correct? Precisely because of what 
has just happened in Zubik v. Burwell, where SCOTUS vacated the previous judgments and 
sent the parties back to the negotiating table to work out an arrangement that would be judicially 
acceptable. Zubik was the consolidation of a number of lower-court cases, including most 
famously Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell,17 in which a religious non-profit organization 
also objected to the contraceptive mandate as substantially burdensome to freedom of religion 
under RFRA. The difference from Hobby Lobby, however, is crucial: whereas in Hobby Lobby 
the Supreme Court held that the objectors (owners of closely-held, for-profit corporations) were 
entitled to the same accommodation granted to religious non-profits, allowing them to opt out 
of providing the relevant insurance coverage, the objectors in Little Sisters of the Poor and then 
in Zubik objected to the very accommodation itself. 
Now, without going into the technical details of how the accommodation—or “opt-out”—
operates, and although it is fair to say that a good chunk of the argument revolved around these 
minutiae, when it is distilled to its essence the objection was against the very idea of opting 
out. In other words, the objectors argued that by having to give notice, either to the Department 
of Health and Human Services or to their insurer or third-party administrator (TPA), of the fact 
that they objected on religious grounds to purchasing the coverage, they were illicit co-
operators in wrongdoing. They claimed that “submitting this notice substantially burdens the 
exercise of their religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.”18 
Now the Supreme Court declined to decide the case on the merits, no doubt under the 
influence of the recent death of Justice Scalia, leaving SCOTUS at a four-four split in terms of 
liberals versus conservatives, broadly speaking. Be that as it may, and despite the “spin” that 
somehow Zubik was a “victory” for the objectors,19 the fact remains that at the time of writing 
all prior decisions have been vacated and the parties are required by SCOTUS to reach some 
sort of arrangement. Yet the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals judgment in Little Sisters, which 
effectively no longer stands, is remarkable for the insight it delivers on the case. The Federal 
Court decided by a majority that the opt-out was a “de minimis administrative task” that did 
not substantially burden the objectors’ exercise of religion under RFRA or the Constitution.20 
Unlike the purchasing of coverage, which constitutes compliance with the ACA obligation, 
opting out by giving notice constitutes a way of avoiding compliance with that obligation: it 
“relieves objectors of their coverage responsibility, at which point federal law shifts that 
responsibility to a different actor.”21 As a de minimis task—filling in a form or sending an 
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email—the opt-out was not substantially burdensome either in terms of the complexity of the 
task or, more important, in terms of making the objectors co-operators in what they sincerely 
believed to be wrongdoing. As the Tenth Circuit put it: “Opting out would eliminate their 
complicity with the Mandate and require only routine and minimal administrative paperwork, 
and they are not substantially burdened by the Government’s subsequent efforts to deliver 
contraceptive coverage in their stead.”22 
Yet didn’t the objectors sincerely believe they would “trigger” the coverage simply by 
opting out? Indeed they did, and the District Court in Reaching Souls International v. Sebelius 
emphasised this point,23 which is why it granted an injunction against the government. The 
Tenth Circuit, however, declined to follow this reasoning, but it seems that, given the reasoning 
in Hobby Lobby, they should have! For recall, the objectors’ belief that they would be an illicit 
co-operator was treated by SCOTUS as a sincerely held religious belief that it was not for the 
Court to second-guess. The District Court in Reaching Souls was applying just that reasoning. 
In Little Sisters, however, the Tenth Circuit Court insisted that opting out had the exact opposite 
effect to implicating the objectors: it relieved them of implication in provision of coverage 
under the mandate. The objectors in Little Sisters specifically raised the point that their sincere 
belief they would be implicated by the opt-out had to be accepted as amounting to a substantial 
burden since that belief would be violated by opting out. Yet the Tenth Circuit Court explicitly 
rejected that argument. It was entitled, the Tenth Circuit held, to assess objectively whether a 
law or regulation amounted to a substantial burden,24 which is precisely what it did by judging 
the opt-out to be an eliminator of complicity rather than a facilitator. 
The essence of the judgment comes out well in the way the Court in Little Sisters handled 
the causation question. The objectors argued that opting out of coverage by giving notice, 
whereupon the insurer, TPA, or government stepped in, would “trigger” the coverage itself.25 
As such, the objectors were painting themselves as having a causal role in the provision of 
objectionable coverage under the mandate. Well, if they sincerely believed they had such a 
role, who is the court to disagree, given Hobby Lobby? It looks, on the face of it, that the Circuit 
Court gets itself into knots on precisely this issue. It affirms that “opting out is necessarily a 
but-for cause of someone else” providing the coverage—whether the insurer, the TPA, or the 
government.26 But the Court then goes on to say that the objectors “do not ‘cause’ contraceptive 
coverage by exercising their ability to opt out.”27 So which is it, and why the scare quotes 
around ‘cause’? 
It seems to me the Tenth Circuit Court is wrestling with the problem of giving an objective 
analysis of co-operation in this case while respecting the objectors’ honest beliefs about what 
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they are doing. The term “but-for cause” is not defined, but presumably the Court means that 
on a simple counterfactual test the objectors, by opting out, do cause the coverage: if they were 
not to opt out, coverage would not be provided by an independent agent, viz., the TPA, the 
insurer, the government, or some combination thereof. But even that is not quite right. If the 
employer were to resist and do nothing, you can be sure that one of the other independent 
agents, i.e., not paid by the employer and not objecting to the coverage, would provide it. If the 
employer were to opt out by giving notice, the same would apply. If the employer were simply 
to go ahead and waive their objection, it is true that no independent agent would step in, since 
it would be the employer themselves footing the bill, with the other agents working with or on 
behalf of the employer to facilitate the process. In the latter scenario, then, the employer would 
be a cause in the counterfactual sense. But comparison with that scenario is not the right one 
to make. By analogy, consider the case of a conscientious objector to serving in the military—
the comparison often made by the courts in these recent cases. Suppose he protested that by 
notifying the government of his objection to serving, he would be a counterfactual cause of 
someone else’s serving, and so would be somehow “triggering” a third party’s participation in 
the military, a form of illicit “but-for” causality. Is this really plausible? What ground could 
the conscientious objector give for this reading of his situation? It seems the only available one 
is that the remaining alternative course of action was for the objector himself to waive his 
objection and be the one to take up arms instead! In other words, if an objector is to be taken 
seriously in their claim of being a counterfactual cause of X, the comparison has to be with an 
alternative scenario in which they are not a cause of X at all, not an alternative in which the 
objector himself would be a direct, personal cause of X. 
Returning to Little Sisters, then, the problem is that the relevant alternative scenarios would 
not prevent coverage being provided, as the Federal Court itself recognized.28 If the objectors 
resist altogether, i.e., do not opt out but sit on their hands instead, a third party will still 
intervene. If the objectors opt in, they will be the cause themselves. So, from the counterfactual 
causation point of view, if there is any co-operation by the objectors it is highly dispensable 
and hence easier to justify than if the opt-out were absolutely necessary for any coverage to be 
provided.29 So what could the Tenth Circuit Court have meant by initially saying that opting-
out was a “but-for” cause of the coverage? Perhaps it had in mind the implicit comparison by 
the objectors to the case where they footed the bill instead. As we have just seen, however, such 
a comparison is of no avail. Or perhaps the Court was merely giving a nod to the objectors’ 
sincere belief that they were a “but-for” cause of the coverage. In the end, however, the Court 
simply could not hold back from giving a dispassionate analysis of the causal situation, nor 
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should it have done otherwise. I think we should interpret the Court as saying something like 
the following: “If the objectors sincerely believe they are in some way causally responsible for 
the coverage should they opt out, they can have their belief. In some bare sense, a ‘but-for’ 
sense involving a comparison on some dimension or other, opting out is a cause. But causation 
is not complicity. You do not become a co-operator, let alone a co-operator in wrongdoing, 
merely by being a bare cause.” 
If that is what the Tenth Circuit meant, they grasped the situation correctly. Opting out is no 
more a form of co-operation than walking away when there is no duty to act, even though by 
walking away someone else will do something to which you object. Of course the devil can be 
in the detail, which was the subject of much analysis both by the Tenth Circuit and in oral 
argument before the Supreme Court. There is no room to discuss all of that here. Suffice it to 
say that in no way was any form of opt-out available to the objectors an authorization, explicit 
or implicit, for anyone else to go ahead and provide coverage. There was no “permission slip,” 
as the objectors complained; on the contrary, as the Tenth Circuit Court observed, “The 
government is not compelling the plaintiffs to endorse or license something they consider 
objectionable; instead, the government is allowing them to decline a legal responsibility while 
requiring another party to perform it in their stead.”30 
The distinction seems to me impeccable. An opt-out, by its very nature, does not meet the 
definition of a co-operative deed, one that assists a principal agent in carrying out a primary 
act. It is certainly not formal co-operation, but neither is it material. The objector cannot say: 
“I am a material co-operator by opting out, since I know that by doing so the principal agent 
will provide that to which I object.” One might as well say that, by running away from a riot in 
order to protect oneself, one is assisting the rioters. Now there might be a good reason not to 
run away, just as there might be a good reason not to opt out: one might be able to help stop 
the riot in the former case, and in the latter one might be able to stop the objectionable primary 
act by not opting out (although, as already noted, this was highly unlikely in the case under 
discussion, except perhaps for TPAs if Justice Baldock’s partial dissent is correct). But that is 
different from saying that by opting out one is a co-operator. Merely being knowingly 
involved, in some bare causal sense, perhaps merely counterfactual, in the occurrence of some 
state of affairs does not make one a co-operator. To be a material co-operator, one has 
knowingly to assist the primary agent; when one opts out, one does not do this. In such a case, 
questions of proximity and the like do not even arise. 
So the Tenth Circuit in Little Sisters accurately assessed the situation and implicitly resiled 
from the reasoning in Hobby Lobby without saying as much. In his partial dissent, however, 
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Justice Baldock clearly and explicitly recognizes the problem, albeit he does not see it as a 
problem. So we have him citing lower-court judges who held that even if “religious 
organizations are misguided in thinking that this scheme […] makes them complicit in 
facilitating contraception or abortion,”31 that is not for the courts to second-guess. Justice 
Baldock adds: “Hobby Lobby supports this position well.”32 Nevertheless, he does not pursue 
this issue and goes on instead to focus on a possible technical distinction between insured 
plaintiffs, where he agrees with the majority, and self-insured plaintiffs using TPAs, where he 
argues the plaintiffs’ sincere beliefs align with reality. 
For my purposes, the point is that some judges do think that mere sincerity is enough when 
it comes to RFRA cases, and as a matter of fact Hobby Lobby supports this view. I submit that 
this is an absurd position to be in. One might salvage the situation by arguing that, just as Justice 
Baldock did with sincerity and reality in the case of self-insured plaintiffs, so in Hobby Lobby 
what was really going on was that purchasing coverage, to which the owners objected, was 
clearly not morally neutral, as I suggested earlier in discussing the situation in California. On 
this line of reasoning, the sincere belief of the owners that they would be illicit (material) co-
operators was grounded in reality, and so no deep analysis was needed of what the conditions 
for illicit co-operation actually were. 
Yet this is mere speculation. On the face of it, Hobby Lobby does support the “mere 
sincerity” view, which is troubling because it strictly does allow that RFRA applies to a sincere 
belief that an opt-out can be a means of illicit co-operation.33 If sincerity is enough, then by the 
reasoning in Hobby Lobby a court might allow a RFRA claim by an employee of a non-
objecting corporation, who was required on pain of dismissal to take the company mail to the 
post office—including health insurance contracts the employee found objectionable. Although 
the employee’s co-operation would be both remote and dispensable, her sincere belief that she 
was an illicit co-operator could not be gainsaid on the most obvious interpretation of Hobby 
Lobby. 
The courts should not allow sincerity to be enough. What they have to do, and what the 
Supreme Court, for reasons one can understand, ducked in Hobby Lobby, is to articulate some 
general, reasonable, and objective principles of co-operation that would enable a dispassionate 
analysis of where a conscientious objector might stand, whatever their sincerely held beliefs. 
Justice Alito was quite right to assert in Hobby Lobby that the ethics of co-operation represent 
“a difficult and important question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances 
under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the 
effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another.”34 Difficulties 
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notwithstanding, courts need to take notice of what both philosophers and theologians have 
said about this very question. Taking notice of moral theology does not entail assessment of 
the merits of a distinctively religious belief, nor does it entail adopting any particular religious 
position. Rather, it means recognizing the philosophical merits of the hard work put in by some 
very clever moral theologians over the decades, and using the fruits of that labor to bring some 
order into what currently threatens to be judicial chaos. With freedom of religion and of 
conscience on the line as never before, the least the courts can do is to give objectors a clear 
pathway through the legal thickets. Those asserting their RFRA rights and who are not, 
objectively, illicit co-operators in wrongdoing still have many other avenues to make their 
protests heard, such as the time-honored ones of pressure on Congress, media publicity, and 
civil disobedience to unjust laws. 
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1. See http://www.adfmedia.org/files/CDMHCInvestigationClosureLetter.pdf. 
2. My original paper on the topic is “The Ethics of Co-operation in Wrongdoing,” in 
Modern Moral Philosophy, ed. Anthony O’Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 203–27. This paper was cited in the majority judgment of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (573 U. S. [2014], slip op. at 36, n. 34). 
3. Hence a formal co-operator does approve the wrongful act, but can do so even if they 
don’t see it as wrong. A person might think it just fine to rape someone as an act of 
revenge, say, and so approve the act, without thinking the act wrongful. In other words, 
approval of the wrongful act does not entail thinking of it as wrong, and in fact usually 
occurs in conjunction with the belief that it is somehow justified. 
4. For an outline and defence of PDE, see my Moral Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 
ch. 3, as well as my “The Doctrine of Double Effect,” in A Companion to the Philosophy 
of Action, ed. T. O'Connor and C. Sandis (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010): 324–330. 
5. To repeat, not as a means to. 
6. A classic double-effect case. One can think of similar cases if this sort of example does 
not convince. 
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7. The term “seamless coverage” is used in connection with the “contraceptive mandate,” 
but obviously applies equally to abortion, as far as the government is concerned (and 
note that objectors to the contraceptive mandate have sometimes focused on the 
abortifacient contraceptives in particular, as in Hobby Lobby). See oral argument in 
Zubik v. Burwell, http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/ 
14-1418_1bn2.pdf, at pp. 19, 20, 32, 42, 48, 60, 83. Accessed July 4, 2016. 
8. Some have closed while others have disaffiliated from the church in order to continue 
providing gay adoption and hence maintain charitable status under the law. See 
http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2013/07/04/how-many-catholic-
adoption-societies-have-actually-closed-down-and-how-many-are-now-quietly-
handing-children-over-to-gay-adoptive-parents/. Accessed July 4, 2016. 
9. See http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-1418_8758.pdf. Accessed July 
4, 2016. 
10. I will usually refer only to “religious” belief since the bulk of the jurisprudence in the 
area concerns religious freedom, and after all the key legislation is the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act. Nevertheless, the same issues apply to conscientious 
objection in general, where the grounds are generically ethical rather than specifically 
religious. I will, however, continue to speak of “conscientious objection” as well as 
“religious objection” since the former is standard terminology even in the religious 
context. 
11. Whether or not the objector also believes abortion is wrong for non-religious reasons. 
12. An excellent overview of the teaching can be found in J.A. McHugh and C.J. Callan, 
Moral Theology: A Complete Course, vol. 1 (New York: Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., 1958), 
615–641. The references by Justice Alito in Hobby Lobby (slip op. at 36, n. 34) are also 
pertinent sources. 
13. Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 37–38. 
14. Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division (450 U.S. 707 
[1981]); Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (490 U.S. 680 [1989]). 
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15. Whether it really is does not matter for present purposes; in any case, the availability 
of coverage without employer co-operation is hard to work out given the changing 
circumstances in which the ACA is being implemented. 
16. Hobby Lobby, slip Op. at 9–10, and n.8. 
17. See http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/LSP-Op.pdf (2015). 
Accessed July 6, 2016. 
18. Zubik, slip op. at 3. 
19. See, e.g., http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/05/supreme-court-decision-a-
huge-victory-for-little-sisters. 
20. Little Sisters, slip op. at 42, 45, 50, 51, 78, 79, 84 (header pagination). 
21. Ibid., 60. 
22. Ibid., 82. 
23. 2013 WL 6804259, at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-OK-0002-
0001.pdf, pp. 13–14, quoted in Little Sisters, slip op. at 36. 
24. Little Sisters, slip op. at 48, n. 23. 
25. Ibid., 55. 
26. Ibid., 66. 
27. Ibid., 68. Both quotations occur specifically in the context of self-insured employers 
and their TPAs, since Justice Baldock’s partial dissent (pages 109–133), whilst 
agreeing with most of what the majority held, distinguished the case of TPAs. I will not 
get into the details of that issue; the point is that the Court is quite clear that what it says 
in these quotations applies a fortiori to employers who are not self-insured via TPAs. 
28. Ibid., 68. 
29. As Justice Baldock, partially dissenting, thought was the case with self-insured 
plaintiffs and their TPAs. 
30. Little Sisters, slip op. at 66, n. 36. 
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31. Justice Baldock, in Little Sisters, slip op. at 111, citing dissent of Justice Kavanaugh in 
Priests For Life v. HHS, No. 13–5368 (2015), slip op. at 35, available at 
http://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/13-5368/13-5368-2015-05-
20.pdf?ts=1432159255. Accessed July 7, 2016. 
32. Little Sisters, slip op. at 111. 
33. Assuming that it is a genuine opt-out, i.e. that it is not something else in disguise. And 
we must add the usual “all things being equal” rider. 
34. Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 36, n. 34. 
